Computer Ethics - Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE) Proceedings
Volume 2019 CEPE 2019: Risk & Cybersecurity

Article 12

5-29-2019

Confucian Robot Ethics
Qin Zhu
Colorado School of Mines

Tom Williams
Colorado School of Mines

Ruchen Wen
Colorado School of Mines

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/cepe_proceedings
Part of the Applied Ethics Commons, Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons, Comparative
Philosophy Commons, and the Robotics Commons

Custom Citation
Zhu, Q., Williams, T., & Wen, R. (2019). Confucian robot ethics. In D. Wittkower (Ed.), 2019 Computer Ethics
- Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE) Proceedings, (11 pp.). doi: 10.25884/5qbh-m581 Retrieved from
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/cepe_proceedings/vol2019/iss1/12

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Computer Ethics - Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE) Proceedings by an authorized editor of ODU Digital Commons.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

Confucian robot ethics
Qin Zhu
Colorado School of Mines
Tom Williams
Colorado School of Mines
Ruchen Wen
Colorado School of Mines

Abstract
In the literature of artificial moral agents (AMAs), most work is influenced by either
deontological or utilitarian frameworks. It has also been widely acknowledged that these
Western “rule-based” ethical theories have encountered both philosophical and
computing challenges. To tackle these challenges, this paper explores a non -Western,
role-based, Confucian approach to robot ethics. In this paper, we start by providing a
short introduction to some theoretical fundamentals of Confucian ethics. Then, we
discuss some very preliminary ideas for constructing a Confucian approach to robot
ethics. Lastly, we briefly share a couple of empirical studies our research group has
recently conducted that aimed to incorporate insights from Confucian ethics into the
design of morally competent robots. Inspired by Confucian ethics, this paper argues that
to design morally competent robots is to create not only reliable and efficient human robot interaction, but also a robot-mediated environment in which human teammates
can grow their own virtues.
Keywords: Confucian ethics, Applied ethics, Robot ethics, Artificial moral agents,
Comparative studies

In the literature of artificial moral agents (AMAs), most work is influenced by either
deontological or utilitarian frameworks (Vallor, 2018). It has also been widely
acknowledged that these Western “rule-based” ethical theories have encountered both
philosophical and computing challenges. Most notably, these frameworks often struggle
to “accommodate the constant flux, contextual variety, and increasingly opaque horizon
of emerging technologies and their applications” (Vallor, 2018, p. 209). To tackle these
challenges, this paper explores a non -Western, role-based, Confucian approach to
robot ethics. In contrast to the Western philosophical approaches to robot ethics (or
ethics in general) that focus on “defin[ing] what the good is” and worry about “how one
can come to know the good,” Chinese philosophers represented by Confucian scholars
are more interested in the problem of “how to become good” (Ivahoe, 2000, p. ix).
Inspired by Confucian ethics, this paper argues that to design morally competent robots
is to create not only reliable and efficient human-robot interaction, but also a robotmediated environment in which human teammates can grow their own virtues.

We argue that exploring a Confucian approach to robot ethics has critical values
in a variety of ways. For instance, philosophers have recently argued that Confucian
ethics can provide other alternative ways of thinking about ethical issues associated
with robotics. As argued by Pak-Hang Wong, “if the philosophy of AI and robotics only
comes from the West, that won’t be enough, because it won’t always apply to non Western countries… And you miss opportunities to think in different ways about
technology” (Cassauwers, 2019). In other words, Confucian ethics along with other non Western ethical resources can enrich the moral imagination of roboticists and enhance
their capabilities to define and engage ethical issues in designing robotics from
culturally diverse perspectives.
Another crucial value for studying Confucian robot ethics is concerned with the
powerful role that China and other cultures with the Confucian heritage (CHCs) such as
Japan, Korea, and Singapore assume in the global market and the global robotics
community. Understanding Confucian ethics is critical for understanding how
policymakers, industrial entrepreneurs, scientists, and the public in CHCs view and
accompany robotics.
In this paper, we start by providing a short introduction to some theoretical
fundamentals of Confucian ethics. Then, we discuss some very preliminary ideas for
constructing a Confucian approach to robot ethics. Lastly, we briefly share a couple of
empirical studies our research group has recently conducted that aimed to incorporate
insights from Confucian ethics into the design of morally competent robots.

Confucian ethics: Theoretical fundamentals
In recent decades, philosophers have employed various approaches to engaging
Confucian ethics ranging from overtly historical or textual approaches to comparative
approaches that put ideas from the classical period into conversation with contemporary
Western ethical, social, and scientific theories (Mattice, 2019). Scholars have tried to
understand Confucian ethics as a species of deontology, virtue ethics, or care ethics
(Mattice, 2019). Until very recently, scholars have attempted to theorize Confucian
ethics as a kind of role-based moral theory (Ames, 2011; Rosemont & Ames, 2016).
The role-based approach to Confucian ethics is one of most recent efforts to reinterpret
and rediscover the value of Confucian ethics. Confucian role ethics argues that we as
humans were born into a web of social relationships. These social relationships have
normative implications and they prescribe specific moral responsibilities for us in the
communities we belong to. Ames (2011) argues that the term person itself is relational
and social (e.g., it is hard to call a human “person” if she is the only human in the world).
For instance, the father-daughter relationship does not only have descriptive values
(e.g., describing an objective relationship between me and my daughter) but also has
normative implications (e.g., what a healthy father-daughter relationship looks like, what
expectations about being a good father are, what I should do to live my role as a father).
Therefore, the Confucian ultimate goal of becoming a good person depends on to what
extent we live well our social roles and practice well the moral responsibilities
prescribed by these social roles.

Relationships, contexts, and social roles are crucial in Chinese philosophy
especially Confucian ethics. The cultivation of the moral self including various virtues
such as the principal virtue ren (仁, benevolence, goodness, or humaneness) takes
place in the development of relationships (Lai, 2017). A person seldom grows her
virtues at home by herself through her own individual actions and reflections. Instead,
reliable virtues are required to be cultivated, tested, and enhanced in her interactions
with others in specific contexts while living her communal roles. As a father, I learn
virtues that define a good father not from reading books but from interactions with my
daughter. The term father is coexistent with the term daughter. My daughter provides
me with opportunities to develop the virtues that are required for being a good father.
Cultivating virtues is thus a project that is engaged in concert with others.
Compared to most Western ethical approaches that focus on moral reasoning
and justification, Confucian ethics places more emphasis on moral practice and
practical wisdom. What is central to Confucian ethics is the moral development model
that consists of three interrelated components: observation, reflection, and practice
(Zhu, 2018). In other words, one must carefully observe how people in the society
interact with others and reflect on whether and how their daily interactions with others
are in accordance with li (礼, rituals or ritual propriety). The appropriate practice of
rituals manifests virtues, whereas virtues underlie and guide the practice of these
rituals. Then, one needs to incorporate her reflective learning experience into her own
future interactions with others and test to what extent she has grasped the appropriate
practice of rituals and their underlying moral virtues.
For Confucians, li or rituals are crucial for ethics practice and they are th e social
norms that are rooted in historical traditions and have been widely recognized as
morally accepted norms in specific cultural contexts (Lai, 2003). Therefore, virtues (e.g.,
ren) and li are independent of each other (Lai, 2017; Shun, 1993). To demonstrate that
one understands well a virtue such as ren, one needs to express it through appropriate
ritual practice in her interactions with others. Conversely, her manner of interaction with
others indicates her grasp of the virtue of ren. In this sense, Confucian criteria for
evaluating one’s moral development are social as they depend on to what extent people
comprehend and appropriately practice rituals in their social interactions. In other words,
someone who fails to or is unwilling to reflectively practice rituals misses opportunities
for moral growth and thus is not a responsible person.
If the ultimate goal for Confucians is that one is always striving to become a good
person through reflective learning in social interactions, then the question becomes
whether everyone has the equal opportunity to achieve such goal. As a follower of
Confucius, Mencius advocated for a kind of moral egalitarianism and believed that all
human beings have the equal potential to become good if they devote themselves to
intentional moral efforts (Munro, 1969, p. 15). To Confucians, what characterizes the
personhood is not so much about one’s innate and inalienable individual human rights
as most Western political and ethical theories would emphasize. Instead, Confucians
think that it is one’s intentional efforts to strive for a good person that defines her
personhood. Simply eating and sleeping without much reflective th inking will not make
someone a true person (at least it is not a kind of person whose life is worth living).

Toward a Confucian robot ethics
A recent essay published in OZY by Tom Cassauwers (2019) aimed to reexamine
ethical issues associated with robotics from two Eastern schools of thought:
Confucianism and Buddhism. This essay includes interviews he conducted with multiple
Eastern philosophers including two Confucian scholars Pak-Hang Wong and Heup
Young Kim. An important theme in Confucian ethics of technology acknowledged by
both Wong and Kim is that technology is never value neutral and it has crucial
instrumental value that helps people acquire virtues such as ren and cultivate the moral
self (Cassauwers, 2019). For instance, Wong mentioned an example in a recent
redesign of Amazon’s virtual assistant Alexa: designers have developed a new feature
“politeness feature” for Alexa which will make Alexa only respond to people who speak
to Alexa politely. Wong argues that such minor design could be made by a Confucian
(Cassauwers, 2019).
Nevertheless, arguably, there remains a question whether these Amazon
designers were actually inspired by Confucian ethical theories or more specifically
Confucian moral psychology. Such question is worth exploring as it is relevant to the
argument discussed earlier that relationships and contexts are important for Confucian
ethics. The effectiveness of Alexa’s politeness feature may be dependent on the
specific role Alexa plays in a context and the relationship between Alexa and the human
interlocutor. I as the father refuse to respond to my daughter’s impolite request might
have different moral impacts on her than if a stranger does the same reaction.
Philosophers of technology such as Peter-Paul Verbeek would agree that design
engineers do have the obligation to imagine the potential relationship that will be
constructed between technology and its user and how such relationship affects the
moral perception and behavior of the user (Verbeek, 2006).
What people are often overlooking is the relational nature embedded in the
design of most robots especially social robots which are being integrated into our
society. When robots are being designed, certain relationships are imagined, defined,
and assigned to those robots and these relationships are often determined by the use
contexts of robots and the specific roles robots are expected to assume in these
contexts (e.g., healthcare robots). Dumouchel and Damiano (2017) recently argue that
social robots such as Geminoid and Paro can only truly interact with other agents, and
not with objects. Unlike humans, these robots have no relation to the world but to their
human partners. These robots were mainly created for the interaction or relationship
with human partners. It is the interaction or relationship between robots and their human
partners that makes the existence of these robots. In this sense, we suggest that
roboticists should not only leverage the traditional, dominant approaches to developing
AMAs that focus on integrating rule-based morality, but also consider an alternative
approach to designing morally competent robots based on the role responsibilities
prescribed by the relationships robots have with human teammates in specific use
contexts.
Philosopher JeeLoo Liu (2017) constructed three principles for Confucian robotic
ethics that are based on the role moralities of robots:
[CR1] A robot must first and foremost fulfill its assigned role.

[CR2] A robot should not act in ways that would afflict the highest displeasure or
the lowest preference onto other human beings, when other options are available.
[CR3] A robot must render assistance to other human beings in their pursuit of
moral improvement, unless doing so would violate [CR1] and [CR2]. A robot must also
refuse assistance to other human beings when their projects would bring out their evil
qualities or produce immorality.
Liu’s three Confucian robotic ethical principles well integrate major elements of
Confucian ethics we introduced in the last section. A moral competent robot is expected
to be able to fulfill its assigned social roles. Such fulfillment of social roles for this robot
is not isolated from but in concert with other humans. For humans, self -cultivation is not
an individual but a social project wh ich the robot can contribute to. In other words, the
interaction between the robot and its human teammate is indeed crucial for the human’s
pursuit of moral development. A socially integrated robot is expected to be sensitive to
the norms shared within human communities and contribute to the evolution of these
norms.
Confucius would probably argue that a social robot who is not capable of
rendering assistance to humans in their pursuit of moral improvement is not worth being
a companion for humans. Such judgment of the moral quality of the robot is comparable
to Confucius’s thesis that moral cultivation is essential to friendship. Interestingly,
philosophers David Hall and Roger Ames (1994) argue that Confucian friendship is
hierarchical despite that the hierarchy in friendship is different from that in other four
Confucian relationships such as the father-son relationship. The hierarchy that exists in
friendship recognizes that difference exists in the level of moral excellence between
oneself and her friend (Lu, 2010). That is partly why Confucius said “do not accept as a
friend one who is not your equal” (Analects, 1.8). Here, friendship as a relationship does
have instrumental value, that is, a good or worthwhile friendship often provides
opportunities and resources for the cultivation of the moral self. If we treat friendship as
a paradigmatic case for the relationship between most social robots and their human
teammates, then shouldn’t we always strive to find robots who are capable of making us
better people? Social robots may be distinguished in terms of their different capabilities
of completing tasks. However, we argue that they should also be distinguished by their
different capabilities of exerting positive impacts on the moral development of their
human teammates.
The emerging literature in responsible innovation suggests that design is a “far
richer process” as it realizes both functional requirements an d moral values.” Designers
not only “can provide us with technical means but also can address the values of people
and society and think about expressing them in material culture and technology” (van
den Hoven, Vermaas, & van de Poel, 2015, p. 3). Therefore, roboticists should not
simply consider robots as efficient means to help human users complete tasks.
Moreover, for designing a social robot, roboticists need to consider other morally
relevant issues such as:
•

What social role is such robot expected to assume in its use context?

•
•

What are characteristics or “traits” of this robot that defines it as a morally
competent or “good” robot? How does the assigned role of the robot prescribe or
specify these characteristics or “traits”?
What kind of person is the human teammate becoming through her everyday
interaction with the robot?

Social robots can be considered as companions with whom humans spend a lot of time.
Nevertheless, does that mean a truly socially integrated robot has always to be polite
and please its human teammate, even when the human teammate proposes morally
questionable requests? Alistair M. C. Isaac and Will Bridewell (2017) point out that
“standing norms” (baseline rules for effective human conversations such as “being polite
or informative”) are important for robots to be truly socially integrated and effectively
communicate with humans. However, they also note that in meaningful conversations
ulterior motives often are more fundamental to and thus supersede these standing
norms. In other words, when designing strategies robots employ to respond to human
requests, roboticist need to consider the ulterior motives (e.g., being a good companion)
that are communicated through robot responses to human requests, in addition to the
standing norms that are expected to be followed by robots and human teammates.
Therefore, is it okay for robots to blame morally questionable requests proposed
by their human teammates as a person would do to another person (e.g., a friend)?
From the Confucian perspective, one may argue that the way in which the robot
responds to the human request is highly contextual and it depends on a variety of
factors such as: under what context the human teammate asks the request, what role
this robot plays, what relationship the robot and the human teammate has established,
the level of ethical sensitivity the human teammate exhibits, and how much the robot
“knows” the nature or personality of its human teammate. It is also worth noting that the
relationship between the robot and its human teammate may also change as they
interact with each other on the daily basis. For instance, if the relationship between a
robot and its human teammate is reliable and trustworthy which is comparable to
friendship in the Confucian sense, then it might be justifiable that the robot should be
able to remonstrate with or blame its human teammate. Arguably, the role responsibility
of the robot prescribed by its relationship with the human teammate encourages the
robot to be responsible for the moral development of the other one who also contributes
to such relationship. This argument is supported by Liu’s third Confucian robotic ethical
principle we mentioned earlier.
To some extent, despite the importance of role responsibility in Confucian ethics,
Western philosophers hold different views on the connection between social roles and
relationships and autonomous moral agency. To Western philosophers such as
Dumouchel and Damiano (2017), the social roles and relationships assigned by
roboticists to robots make robots less independent and thus have less moral agency
which is fundamental for most Western political philosoph ical concepts such as liberty
and autonomy. As discussed earlier, social robots are often designed to work in specific
circumstances and serve certain purposes for humans. They are not independent and
do not have or pursue their own goals. Dumouchel and Damiano (2017) argue that only
robots with no explicit purpose may have autonomous moral agency comparable to

human personhood. Not having an explicit and predetermined purpose indicates that
these robots are free to do anything they want.
In contrast, Asian philosophies pay less attention to the individualistic and liberal
assumption of moral agency or personhood and instead they place more emphasis on
the importance of social roles and relationship to personhood. Arguably, Asian
philosophies such as Confucianism and Buddhism may provide possibilities “for
nonhumans [such as robots] to reach the status of humans” (Cassauwers, 2019). As
argued by Wong,
In Confucianism, the state of reaching personhood is not a given. You need to
achieve it. The person’s attitude toward certain ethical virtues determines
whether or not they reach the status of a human. That also means that we can
attribute personhood to nonhuman things like robots when they play ethically
relevant roles and duties as humans (Cassauwers, 2019).
Philosophical justifications for personhood in the West and the East may further lead to
cultural differences in the public perceptions of robots. Spanish philosopher Jordi
Vallverdú notices the cultural differences in human perceptions of robots between East
and West: “Westerners are generally reluctant about the nature of robotics and AI,
considering only humans as true beings, while Easterners more often consider devices
as similar to humans” (Cassauwers, 2019).

Confucian ethics and designing morally competent robots
In this section, we are trying to provide some practical examples that demonstrate
possible ways in which Confucian ethics can help to understand, inform, and shape the
design of robots, and how this design process can help us refine our understanding of
Confucian ethics.
One of the fundamental activities undertaken by robot designers is the
identification, refinement, and application of design patterns (Alexander, et al., 1977;
Borchers, 2000; Kahn, et al., 2008): abstract patterns of human interaction with the
physical and social world that can be flexibly instantiated, nested, and combined. Kahn
et al. (2008) list claiming unfair treatment or wrongful harm as one of the key design
patterns for social robots, alongside common activities such as initial introductions,
didactic communication, and recovering from mistakes, and describe how this key
interaction pattern of protest can be instantiated from both deontological and
consequentialist perspectives in order to assert a robot’s moral standing.
This design pattern is itself just one example of the broader design pattern of
identifying unfair treatment or wrongful harm, i.e., protesting an action not necessarily
on the basis of unfairness or harm towards oneself, but more generally on the basis of
some identified unfairness or harm. In our own work, we have examined the tradeoffs
between different instantiations of this design pattern. Specifically, we have looked at
different Speech Act-theoretic (Searl, 1969) that robots might reject commands and
requests when they are identified as harmful, examining the differential effects of

phrasing rejections as questions, statements, or rebukes (Jackson, Wen, & Williams,
2019).
But critically, as identified by Kahn et al., this design pattern can also be
instantiated according to different ethical frameworks. Accordingly, this design pattern
presents an excellent testing ground for applying and evaluating the effectiveness of
different ethical frameworks. In recent work, we have accordingly begun to examine
how humans perceive robot rejection of inappropriate commands when those rejections
vary not only according to Speech Act theoretic phrasing, but also according to
underlying ethical framework (Wen, Jackson, Williams, & Zhu, 2019). For example, if a
robot serving as an instructor is asked to perform an action that constitutes or facilitates
cheating, it may issue a question -phrased rejection in multiple ways: asking “Wouldn’t
that be cheating?” draws direct attention to the norm that would be violated if the
directive were accepted, whereas “Would a good instructor do that?” instead draws
attention to the robot’s role, only directly highlighting the prohibitive norm. While our
preliminary results suggest that these role-based norm violation responses lead humans
to perceive robots as better fulfilling their professed roles, we have not yet found any
evidence to suggest that role-based responses lead to any other effects that we might
expect, such as increased mindfulness and self reflection. In our current work, we are
designing experiments that more fully address cultural, contextual, and temporal
considerations that may have prevented us from observing these other hypothesized
effects. If our experiments elicit our hypothesized effects, this will serve as a strong
argument in favor of robotic moral language generation grounded in role-based
frameworks such as Confucian ethics.
Robot designers interested in enabling moral language generation grounded in
Confucian ethics must make design decisions that articulate different positions and
priorities within the Confucian perspective. First, Confucian ethics is a role-oriented
paradigm, and thus designers must decide what roles are appropriate for robots to play
within human society. In Confucian classics, five cardinal relationships (wulun, 五伦) are
delineated: ruler-minister, father-son, husband-wife, older-younger, and friend-friend.
For human-robot relationships, designers must articulate an equivalent set of cardinal
human-robot relationships, e.g. supervisor-subordinate, owner-ownee, adept-novice,
teammate-teammate, and friend-friend. Critically, a designer’s choice of represented
relationships may impact not only the contents of robots’ norm violation responses, but
the decisions as to whether those responses are generated in the first place. For
example, from the point of view of Confucian ethics, if the friend-friend relationship
holds between agents A and B, then A has the role ethics of remonstrating with B when
A observes B committing or proposing wrongdoing: this remonstration is a requirement
for A to be a good friend of B. Thus if designers choose to include friend-friend among
the cardinal human-robot relationships they choose to represent, then this may affect
the frequency with which those robots should choose to respond to proposed norm
violations, and may impact the Speech Act-theoretic phrasing that robots should use in
such circumstances (i.e., blame-laden moral rebukes may be necessary for proper
remonstration when the friend-friend relationship holds between a robot and its
observed norm violator).
Second, Confucian ethics espouses multiple competing objectives that may
conflict with each other. For example, Confucian ethics emphasizes both self reflection

and emotional display of role commitment. When phrasing a rejection from a role-based
perspective, it is possible to differentially encourage these different outcomes: by using
a role-based interrogative (e.g., “Would you be a good friend if you did that?”), the robot
may be able to encourage more self reflection; while when using a role-based rebuke
(“You are a bad friend for asking me to do that!”) the robot may instead demonstrate
more emotional commitment to its role (and provoke a greater emotional response). The
process of designing a robot that must respond to unacceptable commands thus forces
us to think critically not only about what constitutes an ethical response, but also about
how different aspects of an ethical framework may conflict with each other or be chosen
between. Moreover, this provides us an opportunity to interrogate those ethical
commitments. Ultimately, we must ask ourselves whether Confucian principles such as
encouragement of self-reflection and emotional demonstrations of role adherence are
the end goals we strive to achieve, or whether we are only seeking to achieve these
goals because we believe they will lead others to take more role-fulfilling actions in the
future. If our goal is the former, we can use the design, implementation, and evaluation
of our computational models to identify whether those policies actually lead robots’
interactants to achieve those principles; if our goal is the latter, we can further examine
whether achievement of those intermediate principles actually correlates with
achievement of our overarching societal goals. Such examination may allow the
ethically-informed design process to feed back and inform the ethical framework itself,
by quantifying the relative merits of the intermediate principles espoused by that
framework.
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